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1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is generally believed that the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award 
and 18th Constitutional Amendment have taken a major step towards much needed fiscal 
decentralisation. While these two delegate more fiscal autonomy and transfers additional 
resources towards provinces, it seems difficult that tax decentralisation options provided 
in these two can practically be implemented. This assertion is based on historical tax 
decentralisation debate in Pakistan, which has made it a very complex issue in 
management of public finances.  
There are arguments both in favour and against tax decentralisation in Pakistan.  
Its proponents argue that tax decentralisation is an important principle of governance. 
They generally propose three advantages of fiscal decentralisation including; preference-
matching, efficiency through competition, and increased accountability.  In particular, a 
rational assignment of taxing powers helps providing each level of government, a control 
over its fiscal destiny by allowing it the choice in the level of spending.  It helps assuring 
taxpayers that they are getting what they paid for and consequently may stimulate 
participation and improve/increase accountability. According to Bahl (1999), fiscal 
decentralisation assists in revenue mobilisation, innovation in economic activity, 
accountability of elected officials and grassroots participation in governance. Given this, 
it is probable that fiscal decentralisation lead towards improved efficiency in the use of 
resources as the residents in the sub-national governments can decide about their desired 
mix of public services and revenues that best suits them.  
On the other hand, its opponents counter argue that its implementation seems 
difficult due to various factors like provincial governments do not have capacity to 
collect taxes, and the bulk of the taxes in Pakistan are usually paid at the headquarters of 
the firm that may lead to an unfair allocation of revenues after decentralisation.  At the 
same time, the tax administration in Pakistan desires to move from General Sales Tax 
(GST) to reformed GST in Value Added Tax (VAT) mode in order to increase the tax-to-
GDP ratio.  Implementation of this would make the tax decentralisation much more 
complicated as it is difficult to distinguish the sales tax revenues from goods and services 
 
Iffat Ara <iffatara@spdc.org.pk> is Principal Economist, Social Policy and Development Centre 
(SPDC). Muhammad Sabir <muhammadsabir@spdc.org.pk> is Principal Economist, Social Policy and 
Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi. 
Ara and Sabir 480 
as a good producing factory also consume many services including telecommunication. 
Furthermore, as highlighted by Ahmed (2010) the abject performance of FBR and “trust 
deficit” among provinces and with the federal government add more complications in the 
practicality of GST reforms.   
Despite these contradictory arguments, attempts were made to analyse the scope of 
sales tax on services by provincial governments to enhance tax-to-GDP ratio in Pakistan.  
SPDC (1994) is a systematic attempt which provides a comprehensive framework for 
sales taxation of services by provincial governments.  It analysed the constitutional 
domain for implementing sales tax on services as per 1973 constitution.  It also looked at 
the incidence of indirect taxes on services and concluded that nominal incidence of 
federal and provincial taxes on services sector was 2.3 percent of their value added.  It 
also laid down a criterion for provincial resource mobilisation through effective 
implementation of GST on services.  The criterion gave higher weightage to under 
taxation, extent of incidence on richer households, case for integration with national VAT, 
level of compliance, ease of collection and so on.  It also proposed specific taxation 
proposals for services sector including banking and insurance, wholesale and retail, 
telecommunication and others.  Regardless of such attempts, in 2000, the provincial 
governments empowered federal government to implement GST services.  Since then 
GST services is being collected by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).  
At present, in Pakistan financial status of provincial governments largely hinges on 
federal transfers to the provinces constituted through NFC award rather than on a rational 
tax assignment. There is an overriding centralisation of revenue collection as over 90 
percent of the revenues are collected at the federal level consequently leaving the 
provinces with very narrow tax bases. From the perspective of sustainable public service 
provision, the provincial governments require enough “own” revenues rather than heavily 
relying on federal transfers and grants. GST on services is an ideal option for 
decentralisation ensured by the 18th Constitutional Amendment and 7th NFC Award.  
In this context, this paper is an attempt to analyse the devolution of GST services 
and vertical imbalance in Pakistan.  It determines the scope of GST services in 
minimising vertical imbalances, if implemented practically.  Since, GST services has 
been initiated in 2000-01, the paper cover the period 2000-01 to 2009-10.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 underlines the constitutional provision 
of revenue assignment; Section 3 presents the pattern of resource mobilisation in Pakistan; 
Section 4 reveals the extent of vertical imbalance in Pakistan; Section 5 analyses the 
devolution of GST services and its impact on vertical imbalance; Section 6 discusses the 
implementation challenges in collecting GST services; and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  REVENUE ASSIGNMENT AS PER CONSTITUTION 
In Pakistan, the constitution and certain statutes designate the revenue assignments 
between the federal and provincial governments.  After the abolishment of concurrent 
lists in the 18th Amendment, the revenue source assigned to the federal and provincial 
governments is through an express provision in an article of the constitution or through 
classification in the federal lists of subjects.  In the latter case if the revenue source is 
mentioned in the Federal List it belongs to the federation only. However, if a revenue 
source is not mentioned in the Federal List it then belongs to the provinces only. 
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Federal taxes under the Fourth Schedule, Article 70(4), of the Constitution of 
Pakistan are given Table 1. It states that among the indirect taxes the federal government 
has a constitutional right to collect taxes only on the sales and purchases of goods 
(imported, exported, produced, manufactured or consumed) but not on sales of services.  
This provides autonomy to the provincial governments to levy sales tax on services.   
 
Table 1 
Federal Revenue Assignment as per Constitutional Provision 
Federal Taxes Federal Legislative List 
Direct Taxes 
  Personal Income Tax (excl. Agricultural Income) subject 47 
  Corporate Income Tax  subject 48 
  Capital Value Tax (excl. Immovable Property) subject 50 
Indirect Taxes 
  Duties of Customs (Including Export Duties) subject 43 
  Excise Duty (Except on Alcohol, Narcotics) subject 44 
  Taxes on the Sales and Purchases of Goods  
    (Except Sales Tax on Services) subject 49 
  Mineral Oil, Minerals, Natural Gas subject 51 
  Tax on Production Capacity subject 52 
  Terminal Taxes on Goods Transport and Passengers subject 53 
 
The revenue assignment of provincial governments according to the constitutional 
scheme is given in Table 2. It is to be mentioned that property tax, capital gains,  excise 
duty, sales tax on services, tax on professions, motor vehicle tax are shared revenues 
under the NFC clauses of the constitution. The base and rate are set by the federation. 
 
Table 2 
Provincial Revenue Assignment as per Constitutional Provision 
Provincial Taxes Constitutional Scheme 
Direct Taxes 
   Property Tax Residuary but there is bar in the Federal List       
(subject 51) 
   Capital Gains Assigned through bar on the federation in the Federal 
List (subject 50) 
   Agriculture Income Tax Through bar on the federation in the Federal List 
(subject 47) 
Indirect Taxes 
Excise Duty on 
Alcohol/Liquor/Narcotics 
Assigned to province by bar on the federation in the 
Federal List (subject 44) 
Sales Tax on Services Residuary assignment 
Tax on Professions Article 163 of the constitution 
Motor Vehicle Tax Residuary assignment 
Stamp Duty Residuary assignment 
Registration Fee Residuary assignment 
Mutation Fee Residuary assignment 
Natural Gas Excise Duty Article 161 of the constitution 
Net Hydro Profits Article 161 of the constitution 
Electricity Duty Article 157(2) (b)of the constitution 
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Thus, according to the constitution of Pakistan, federal government is empowered 
to levy GST only on the sales, purchase and consumption of goods; however GST on 
services exclusively falls under the domain of provincial governments.  
It was for this very reason that provinces levied sales tax on services on 15th July 
2000. Later on, in 2000-01, the provincial governments empowered the federal 
government to collect GST services on their behalf.  Since then federal government has 
been collecting GST services by breaking it into two modes: GST CE mode and GST 
provincial.  The latter has been transferred to provinces (after deducting the collection 
charges) on the basis of population rather than collection.  CE mode was being treated 
similar to GST goods before the implementation of 7th NFC Award (July 2010).   
Though, collection of sales tax on services already remains a constitutional right of 
provinces, the 7th NFC Award and the 18th Constitutional Amendment further 
strengthened this.  The document of the 18th Amendment states, in fourth schedule of the 
constitution, in the federal legislative list, entry 49 after the word “consumed” the 
comma and words “except sales tax on services” shall be added. As a result, GST 
services CE mode is transferred to provincial governments. 
 
3.  RESOURCE MOBILISATION IN PAKISTAN 
Before analysing the impact of tax decentralisation on provincial finances, this 
section presents the pattern of resource mobilisation (generating the required resources to 
carry out expenditures for public service delivery) in Pakistan by major revenue source 
both at the federal and provincial levels.   
 
3.1.  Resource Mobilisation at Federal Level  
Table 3 gives the magnitude and growth in different components of FBR tax 
revenue in Pakistan.  In 2009-10, total tax revenue in Pakistan was Rs 1,380 billion.  Of 
this, 39 percent were the direct taxes and 61 percent were indirect taxes. 16 percent of the 
indirect taxes were originated via excise duties and 20 percent via import duties while the 
remaining from GST on goods and services.   
 
Table 3 
Components of Federal Tax Revenue  
(Rs Million) 
  
 Year  
Total 
Tax  
Revenues 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect Taxes 
Total Excise  
Duties 
Import 
Duties 
GST 
Total Goods Services 
2000-01 392,277 124,585 267,692 49,080 65,047 153,565 144,981 8,584 
2001-02 404,070 142,505 261,565 47,186 47,818 166,561 154,787 11,774 
2002-03 460,627 151,898 308,729 44,754 68,836 195,139 180,991 14,148 
2003-04 520,843 165,079 355,764 45,552 91,045 219,167 203,713 15,454 
2004-05 590,387 183,372 407,015 53,104 115,374 238,537 214,519 24,018 
2005-06 713,442 224,988 488,454 55,272 138,384 294,798 263,767 31,031 
2006-07 847,236 333,737 513,499 71,804 132,299 309,396 267,531 41,865 
2007-08 1,008,091 387,861 620,230 92,137 150,663 377,430 325,752 51,678 
2008-09 1,161,150 443,548 717,602 117,455 148,403 451,744 395,154 56,590 
2009-10 1,380,000 540,400 839,600 134,400 164,900 540,300 473,474 66,826 
Average Annual Growth Rate (%) 
2001–05 11.29 10.21 11.94 -0.53 16.39 15.67 10.39 30.49 
2006–10 17.94 25.19 14.65 25.03 4.77 16.56 16.08 21.49 
2001–10 14.91 17.45 13.83 10.15 12.10 16.82 14.31 26.35 
Source: Federal Board of Revenue, Yearbook (Various Issues). 
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The trend in growth indicates that tax revenue increased at an average rate of 11 
percent per annum during 2001-05 and 18 percent during 2006-10; indicating higher 
growth in federal taxes in the second half on 2000s.  In the first half of 2000s, highest 
growth was observed in GST services while in second half it was in direct taxes.  During 
the entire period, GST services depicted highest growth that could be due to the fact that 
it started from a zero base.  
Table 4 presents the trend in tax to GDP ratio in Pakistan.  It shows that total tax 
revenue remained on average 9.2 percent per annum of GDP during 2001-05 and 
increased slightly to 9.5 percent during 2006-10.  Direct taxes that on average constituted 
3 percent per annum of GDP during 2001-05 increased on average by 0.5 percentage 
points during 2006-10. Alternatively, indirect taxes declined from an average of 6.2 
percent per annum of GDP to 5.9 percent of GDP during these two sub-periods.  It is 
noticeable that contribution of GST on goods in GDP remained on average over 3 percent 
per annum during these sub-periods while that of GST on services stayed at less than 0.5 
percent.
1
  
 
Table 4 
Trend in Tax-to-GDP Ratio 
(Percent) 
  
 Year  
Total 
Tax  
Revenues 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect Taxes 
Total Excise  
Duties 
Import 
Duties 
GST 
Total Goods Services 
2000-01 9.32 2.96 6.36 1.17 1.55 3.65 3.44 0.20 
2001-02 9.07 3.20 5.87 1.06 1.07 3.74 3.48 0.26 
2002-03 9.45 3.12 6.33 0.92 1.41 4.00 3.71 0.29 
2003-04 9.23 2.93 6.31 0.81 1.61 3.89 3.61 0.27 
2004-05 9.08 2.82 6.26 0.82 1.78 3.67 3.30 0.37 
2005-06 9.36 2.95 6.41 0.73 1.82 3.87 3.46 0.41 
2006-07 9.77 3.85 5.92 0.83 1.53 3.57 3.08 0.48 
2007-08 9.84 3.79 6.06 0.90 1.47 3.68 3.18 0.50 
2008-09 9.11 3.48 5.63 0.92 1.16 3.55 3.10 0.44 
2009-10 9.41 3.68 5.72 0.92 1.12 3.68 3.23 0.46 
Average Annual Ratios 
2001–05 9.23 3.00 6.23 0.95 1.48 3.79 3.51 0.28 
2006–10 9.50 3.55 5.95 0.86 1.42 3.67 3.21 0.46 
2001–10 9.36 3.28 6.09 0.91 1.45 3.73 3.36 0.37 
Source: Federal Board of Revenue, Yearbook (Various Issues). 
 
3.2. Resource Mobilisation at Provincial Level  
Table 5 gives the resource mobilisation efforts at provincial level. Compared to Rs 
1,380 billion tax collected by the federal government in 2009-10, provincial governments 
altogether collected only Rs 70 billion.  It further indicates that provincial tax revenues 
increased from a meagre Rs 19.1 billion in 2000-01 to Rs 70 billion in 2009-10. On the 
other hand, non-tax revenues increased from Rs 19.9 billion to Rs 95 billion during same 
period.  
 
1See Martinez-Vanquez (2006) and Thirk (2008) for analysis of taxation and policies in Pakistan. 
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Table 5 
Provincial Revenues 
(Rs Million) 
 Year  Tax Non-Tax Total 
2000-01 19,100 19,900 39,000 
2001-02 18,800 21,300 40,100 
2002-03 21,800 25,400 47,200 
2003-04 28,000 25,000 53,000 
2004-05 34,710 22,404 57,114 
2005-06 36,800 47,600 84,400 
2006-07 36,819 45,408 82,227 
2007-08 40,794 77,987 118,781 
2008-09 46,084 83,789 129,873 
2009-10  70,000 95,000 165,000 
Average Annual Growth Rates (%) 
2001–05 13.68 7.59 10.46 
2006–10 16.35 40.08 25.21 
2000–10 15.01 23.84 17.84 
Source: GoP, Economic Survey. 
 
Relative to taxes, higher growth in non-tax revenues indicates that provincial 
revenues are tilted towards non-tax revenue.  Further, over the entire period, provincial 
taxes grew at a pace similar to federal taxes suggesting that capacity of provincial 
governments in collecting taxes is not as bad as it usually argued. 
 
4.  VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCE IN PAKISTAN 
Vertical fiscal imbalance means the disparity between the revenues of a 
government and its expenditure responsibilities. An adequate provision of social services 
is a concurrent function of federal and provincial governments.  However, the 
combination of decentralised spending with centralised financing through grants and tax 
revenue sharing leads to vertical fiscal imbalance.  This situation prevails in Pakistan 
where the financing and delivery of social services largely lie in the hands of provinces 
and major sources of revenues in the hand of federal government creating vertical 
imbalances.  
Table 6 shows the total tax and non-tax revenue collected by the federal and 
provincial governments.  Noticeably, the table reveals that the federal government 
collects 92 percent to 94 percent of the revenue in Pakistan.  Only 6 percent to 8 percent 
of the revenues are collected by the provincial governments. This suggests that provincial 
governments have a very narrow base of revenue collection. 
Decentralisation of GST Services and Vertical Imbalances  485 
Table 6 
Revenue Collection of Federal and Provincial Governments 
 Year  
Total Revenues (Rs Million) Share in Revenues (%) 
Federal Provincial Total Federal Provincial 
2000-01 514,000 39,000 553,000 92.9 7.1 
2001-02 584,000 40,100 624,100 93.6 6.4 
2002-03 673,600 47,200 720,800 93.5 6.5 
2003-04 741,000 53,000 794,000 93.3 6.7 
2004-05 842,900 57,114 900,014 93.7 6.3 
2005-06 992,200 84,400 1,076,600 92.2 7.8 
2006-07 1,215,730 82,227 1,297,957 93.7 6.3 
2007-08 1,380,599 118,781 1,499,380 92.1 7.9 
2008-09 1,721,028 129,873 1,850,901 93.0 7.0 
2009-10  1,990,387 165,000 2,155,387 92.3 7.7 
Source: GoP, Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
Table 7 gives only the total tax collection of federal and provincial governments. It 
further strengthens the point that provinces have limited control in collection of taxes in 
Pakistan.  In most of the years since 2000-01, provincial governments collected only 4 
percent of the total taxes in the country.  
 
Table 7 
Tax Collection of Federal and Provincial Governments 
 Year  
Total Taxes (Rs Million) Share in Taxes (%) 
Federal Provincial Total Federal Provincial 
1999-00 386,800 18,800 405,600 95.4  4.6  
2000-01 422,500 19,100 441,600 95.7  4.3  
2001-02 459,300 18,800 478,100 96.1  3.9  
2002-03 534,000 21,800 555,800 96.1  3.9  
2003-04 583,000 28,000 611,000 95.4  4.6  
2004-05 624,700 34,710 659,410 94.7  5.3  
2005-06 766,900 36,800 803,700 95.4  4.6  
2006-07 852,866 36,819 889,685 95.9  4.1  
2007-08 1,009,902 40,794 1,050,696 96.1  3.9  
2008-09 1,158,586 46,084 1,204,670 96.2  3.8  
2009-10  1,523,497 70,000 1,593,497 95.6  4.4  
Source: GoP, Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
On the other hand, the current expenditures of the federal and provincial 
government given in Table 8 indicate that the share of provinces in total current 
expenditure is far high.  Provinces spend 23 percent to 29 percent of the total current 
expenditure in Pakistan.  It needs to mention that the share of provinces would go up if 
these expenditures include the amount of development expenditures.   
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Table 8 
Current Expenditures of Federal and Provincial Governments 
 Year  
Total Current Expenditure (Rs Million) Share (%) 
Federal Provincial Total Federal Provincial 
1999-00 477,900 148,500 626,400 76.3 23.7 
2000-01 479,000 166,700 645,700 74.2 25.8 
2001-02 524,600 175,600 700,200 74.9 25.1 
2002-03 599,800 191,900 791,700 75.8 24.2 
2003-04 557,000 218,000 775,000 71.9 28.1 
2004-05 664,200 200,300 864,500 76.8 23.2 
2005-06 789,100 245,600 1,034,700 76.3 23.7 
2006-07 973,130 402,215 1,375,345 70.8 29.2 
2007-08 1,416,015 437,132 1,853,147 76.4 23.6 
2008-09 1,495,873 545,697 2,041,570 73.3 26.7 
2009-10  1,670,963 590,000 2,260,963 73.9 26.1 
Source: GoP, Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
Thus, while provincial share in tax revenue on average is less than 5 percent 
during the 2000s their share in expenditure is over 25 percent indicating the extent of 
vertical imbalance in Pakistan.  This builds the argument that provinces to a large extent 
depend on the resources or transfers from the federal government to meet their 
expenditures demand. Accordingly, in Pakistan, 88 percent of the provincial 
government‟s resources depend on intergovernmental transfers.  In contrast, in other 
developing countries, like India and Malaysia, 35 percent of the provincial government‟s 
resources come from intergovernmental transfers.  
 
5.  DEVOLUTION OF GST SERVICES AND VERTICAL IMBALANCE 
Having developed that there are significant vertical imbalances in Pakistan, it 
is important to analyse whether or not devolution of GST services will make any 
sizeable impact.  As Khan (2009) highlights that services sector constitutes more 
than half of the value added of the economy, but it is fetching only 34  percent of the 
federal tax receipts. While mentioning the difficulties in taxing services, he points 
out that many services are rendered at the distribution process or at the stage of 
production, which sometime have informal characteristics, hence making it difficult 
to collect taxes from them.  Given the narrow base of services and difficulties 
attached to collecting taxes from them, this section first highlights the contribution of 
GST in overall FBR taxes and then looks whether GST services has sizeable tax base. 
As per scope of the study, it excludes other taxation on services sector such as 
Federal Excise Duty (FED), income tax and the like. It also compares effective tax 
rate of GST services with other taxes to highlight the tax potential in GST services. 
Afterwards, it compares the vertical imbalances in revenue transfer to the provincial 
governments with or without GST services.   
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5.1.  Contribution of GST Services in FBR Taxes 
Table 9 gives the contribution of GST on services in comparison with GST on 
goods under different tax heads.  For instance, in total GST, services contributed on 
average only 7.4 percent per annum during 2001-05, which increases to 12.6 percent 
during 2005-10.  GST services contributed on average 4.5 percent per annum in total 
indirect taxes and 3 percent per annum in total tax revenue during 2001-05. These shares 
increased to 7.7 percent and 4.8 percent respectively during 2006-10.  While in 
comparison with GST goods these shares are still very low, they showed relatively higher 
growth.  
 
Table 9 
Contribution of GST on Goods and Services 
(Percent) 
  Year 
GST on Goods as Proportion of Total GST on Services as Proportion of Total 
  GST Indirect Tax Tax Revenue GST Indirect Tax Tax Revenue 
2000-01 94.41 54.16 36.96 5.59 3.21 2.19 
2001-02 92.93 59.18 38.31 7.07 4.50 2.91 
2002-03 92.75 58.62 39.29 7.25 4.58 3.07 
2003-04 92.95 57.26 39.11 7.05 4.34 2.97 
2004-05 89.93 52.71 36.34 10.07 5.90 4.07 
2005-06 89.47 54.00 36.97 10.53 6.35 4.35 
2006-07 86.47 52.10 31.58 13.53 8.15 4.94 
2007-08 86.31 52.52 32.31 13.69 8.33 5.13 
2008-09 87.47 55.07 34.03 12.53 7.89 4.87 
2009-10 87.63 56.39 34.31 12.37 7.96 4.84 
Average Annual Shares 
2001–05 92.59 56.39 38.00 7.41 4.51 3.04 
2006–10 87.47 54.02 33.84 12.53 7.74 4.83 
Source: Federal Board of Revenue, Yearbook (Various Issues). 
 
5.2.  Tax Base of GST Services 
Table 10 shows the ratios of GST goods and GST services base to GDP.  While 
base-to-GDP ratio of GST goods substantially increased, base-to-GST ratio of services 
hovered around over 20 percent during the two sub-periods. This happened because FBR 
focused only on the efficiency of GST services collection till 2008-09, without 
broadening its tax base.  However in 2009-10, new services like banking insurances and 
other were also added to broaden its base.  
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Table 10 
GST Base-to-GDP Ratio 
(Percent) 
Year  Total GST GST Goods GST Services 
2000-01 48.41 27.81 20.60 
2001-02 47.56 26.47 21.08 
2002-03 48.27 26.96 21.31 
2003-04 50.95 30.58 20.37 
2004-05 54.35 34.18 20.17 
2005-06 57.78 37.29 20.49 
2006-07 56.84 36.41 20.44 
2007-08 59.53 39.12 20.41 
2008-09 56.03 33.59 22.44 
2009-10 54.45 31.56 22.89 
Average Annual Ratio 
2001–05 49.9 29.2 20.7 
2006–10 56.9 35.6 21.3 
 
5.3.  Effective Tax Rates 
Table 11 portrays the effective tax rate of different components of tax revenues in 
Pakistan.  It indicates that effective tax rate of GST services hanged on average only about 
1.4 percent and 2 percent per annum respectively during the two sub-periods.  GST on 
goods though declined from an average of 12 percent per annum during 2001-05 to nearly 9 
percent during 2006-10 but remained far above than that of GST on services.  GST services 
have lowest rates because of lower efficiency of tax collection and tax exemptions. This 
lowest effective tax rate indicates greater potential of GST in services sector. 
 
Table 11 
Effective Tax Rate 
(Percent) 
Year 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect Taxes 
Excise 
Duty 
Imports 
Duty 
GST 
Goods Services 
2000-01 4.18 4.72 17.77 12.38 0.99 
2001-02 4.48 4.25 11.95 13.13 1.25 
2002-03 4.37 3.62 14.83 13.77 1.36 
2003-04 4.04 3.11 14.25 11.81 1.35 
2004-05 3.81 2.93 13.30 9.65 1.83 
2005-06 3.95 2.43 12.05 9.28 1.99 
2006-07 5.10 2.75 10.49 8.47 2.36 
2007-08 4.91 2.90 9.92 8.13 2.47 
2008-09 4.68 3.13 8.89 9.23 1.98 
2009-10 4.99 3.15 9.57 10.23 1.99 
Average Annual Rate 
2001–05 4.18 3.73 14.42 12.15 1.36 
2006–10 4.72 2.87 10.19 9.07 2.16 
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Though, it is apparent there exist potential of taxation in the services sector but the 
idea here is to observe how far the vertical imbalance be reduced once the provinces are 
empowered to collect GST services.   
 
5.4.  Share of Provincial Revenues with or without GST Services   
Table 12 displays the share of provincial tax revenues in total taxes with and 
without GST services. It indicates that had the GST services been devolved in 2000-01 
and had it acquired the same efficiency then provincial share of taxes would have 
increased from 4.3 percent to 6.3 percent in 2000-01.  And, with the passage of time this 
share would have further increased to 8.6 percent in 2009-10.  Thus, with full provincial 
share of GST services, provincial share in taxes would have more than doubled during 
2006-10. 
 
Table 12 
Provincial Revenues With or Without GST Services   
(Percent) 
 Year  
Provincial Share in Revenues Provincial Share in Taxes 
Without GST  
Services 
With GST  
Services 
Difference Without GST  
Services 
With GST  
Services 
Difference 
2000-01 7.1 8.6 1.6 4.3 6.3 1.9 
2001-02 6.4 8.3 1.9 3.9 6.4 2.5 
2002-03 6.5 8.5 2.0 3.9 6.5 2.5 
2003-04 6.7 8.6 1.9 4.6 7.1 2.5 
2004-05 6.3 9.0 2.7 5.3 8.9 3.6 
2005-06 7.8 10.7 2.9 4.6 8.4 3.9 
2006-07 6.3 9.6 3.2 4.1 8.8 4.7 
2007-08 7.9 11.4 3.4 3.9 8.8 4.9 
2008-09 7.0 10.1 3.1 3.8 8.5 4.7 
2009-10 7.7 10.8 3.1 4.4 8.6 4.2 
Average Annual Shares 
2001–05 6.6 8.6 2.0 4.4 7.0 2.6 
2006–10 7.3 10.5 3.1 4.2 8.6 4.5 
Source: Authors‟ estimates based on FBR Yearbook. 
 
5.5.  Role of GST Services in Minimising Vertical Imbalances 
Table 13 shows vertical imbalances in Pakistan with or without devolving GST 
services during 2006-07 to 2009-10.  It indicates that if GST services were 
successfully devolved then vertical imbalance would have been reduced. For instance, 
in 2006-07 vertical imbalance would have been reduced from 27.2 percent to 23.9 
percent due to decentralisation of GST services. Similarly in 2009-10, vertical 
imbalance would have been reduced from 24.3 percent to 21.2 percent due to 
decentralisation of GST services.   
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Table 13 
   Vertical Imbalances in Pakistan   
(Percent) 
 Without GST Services With GST Services 
 Year  
Revenue 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Surplus / 
Deficit 
Revenue 
Share 
Expenditure 
Share 
Surplus / 
Deficit 
2006-07       
  Federal 93.7 66.5 27.2 90.4 66.5 23.9 
  Provincial 6.3 33.5 –27.2 9.6 33.5 –23.9 
2007-08       
  Federal 92.1 73.6 18.4 88.6 73.6 15.0 
  Provincial 7.9 26.4 –18.4 11.4 26.4 –15.0 
2008-09       
  Federal 93.0 70.4 22.6 89.9 70.4 19.6 
  Provincial 7.0 29.6 –22.6 10.1 29.6 –19.6 
2009-10       
  Federal 92.3 68.0 24.3 89.2 68.0 21.2 
  Provincial 7.7 32.0 –24.3 10.8 32.0 –21.2 
Source: Authors‟ estimates based on FBR Yearbook. 
  
6.  IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
Despite the fact that devolving GST service has constitutional provision and it also 
reduces the vertical imbalances, this has not yet been put into practice. There are certain 
challenges that often come in its implementation debate. These can be sum-up in 
following three arguments.  
 Provincial governments do not have the capacity to collect GST on services. 
 Under VAT regime, collection of goods and services cannot be separated. 
 Bulk of the taxes in Pakistan are paid at the headquarters of the firm that may 
lead to an unfair allocation of revenues after decentralisation. 
This section systematically discusses the validity of these arguments by analysing 
the structure of GST services. Table 14 presents the GST collected on services by sectors 
in 2009-10. The statistics reveal that GST on services is largely collected from 
telecommunication sector, which contributed more than 70 percent of total GST on 
services. Historically, the share of telecommunication in GST services was more than 90 
percent. The other major tax spinners are banking and insurance (tax collected under 
federal excise duty), community and social services, and transport and communication 
services.  
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Table 14 
General Sales Tax on Services—2009-10 
Sector 
Tax Collection  
(Rs Million) 
Share    
(%) 
Telecommunications 44,852.5 70.4 
Banking and Insurance 5,969.8 9.4 
Community and Social Services 5,368.9 8.4 
Transport and Communication 4,453.2 7.0 
Hotels, Recreation and Entertainment 2,347.7 3.7 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 468.8 0.7 
Other  222.6 0.3 
Total 63,683.5 100.0 
Source: Federal Board of Revenue. 
Note: Banking and Insurance largely includes federal excise duty. 
 
6.1.  Devolution of GST on Telecommunications 
There are several apprehensions regarding the devolution of GST on 
telecommunication services. For example, does it require lots of capacity that provincial 
government do not have at present? Will it lead to an unfair allocation among provinces? 
Is it impossible under VAT regime?  
As per our understanding, the answer to all these questions is in negative. Firstly, 
there are fewer telecommunication companies to deal with. They have computerised 
record and have complete information about usage of their services, charging of bills and 
payment of taxes. As a result, devolution of telecommunication taxes does not require 
much capacity and provincial governments can easily collect tax with these fewer 
computerised telecommunication companies. Their computerised records also help 
minimising the scope of unfair allocation among the provinces. However, devolution of 
GST on telecommunication under VAT mode is relatively a difficult task.  Attempts have 
been made at the federal and provincial (Sindh) government level to resolve this issue. 
Their technical teams concluded, “while VAT regime requires „input-output adjustment‟ 
to be centralised, collection can be decentralised.” For instance, as per 2009-10 estimate 
provinces can collect Rs 45 billion in GST from telecommunications services. Since bulk 
of this tax is collected from end users with limited scope for input output adjustment, 
however, companies seeking refunds submit consolidated (goods and services) 
account/claim to FBR. As per FBR estimates these refunds hardly reached to Rs 3.5 
billion.  After receiving and verifying these refund claims FBR can provide refunds (Rs 
3.5 billion) to companies and provinces can reimburse FBR the amount equivalent to 
refund claims i.e. Rs 3.5 billion. 
 
6.2.  Devolution of GST on Banking and Insurance 
Banking and insurance sector is the second biggest contributor in services tax. At 
present, the services of this sector are taxed under FED mode and not under GST.  
Nevertheless, after the 7th NFC Award, it is likely that this collection can be treated as 
GST. This sector also has smaller number of banking and insurance companies, mostly in 
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formal sector, having computerised records.  Given this, the provincial governments do 
not require much capacity and can easily deal with them. Moreover, complete 
computerised transaction details also minimise the scope of unfair allocations of GST 
among the provinces. Similar to telecommunication sector, the input output adjustment 
can be dealt by federal government; however, the collection can be devolved.   
 
6.3.  Devolution of GST on Other Sectors 
In contrast to telecommunication and banking and insurance, other sectors have 
large number of tax payers.  The provincial governments need to build capacity in order 
to collect GST from them. In this regard, recently an attempt has been made by the 
government of Sindh where it established a board named Sindh Revenue Services (SRS). 
It has an independent board of directors and separate collection mechanism.  Currently, 
the progress of SRS working is slow as the decision to devolved GST services is in 
pending.    
Certain confusions also prevail regarding the collection of GST services. For 
example, there is confusion that if more than one person was involved in consuming a 
service like telecommunication then who will pay the tax.  And if they live in different 
provinces then which province would receive the revenue from GST services. 
Theoretically, this argument seems very difficult but in reality this can be addressed very 
easily.  For example, every telecommunication company charges a fee on its services.  
While two persons are consuming same service the bill is generally paid by one person.  
Since GST service is a proportional tax on billing amount, it would be collected by the 
province whose consumer bears the charges of bill and hence that province will receive 
the revenue. The same logic can be followed if more than one consumer pays the billing 
amount and taxes, whether in a pre- or post-paid manner. 
Another confusion is whether or nor GST service is a part of divisible pool.  Prior 
to the 7th NFC Award, GST on services CE mode was part of the divisible pool and GST 
provincial tax was treated as straight transfers. After the 7th NFC Award, both GST 
provincial and CE mode would be treated as straight transfers and hence GST services 
would no more be part of divisible pool.  
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In Pakistan, confinement of major sources of revenues with the federal 
government and a sizeable expenditures assignment at provincial level creates vertical 
fiscal imbalances. While these vertical imbalances are generally addressees through 
intergovernmental transfers, there is still a need to devolve taxes at provincial levels. The 
7th NFC Award and 18th Constitutional Amendment ensure that a GST services is a 
provincial tax.  In this context, this paper analyses the scope of GST services in 
minimising the vertical fiscal imbalances in Pakistan. The analysis indicates that 
devolution of GST services will help doubling the share of provincial tax revenues in 
total taxes thus facilitate reducing vertical imbalances in Pakistan. Moreover, the 
telecommunication sector, which pays bulk of the GST services, requires limited 
provincial capacities for collection of GST as there are fewer telecommunication 
companies in Pakistan and all have computerised database. 
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Though, the devolution of GST services will reduce the vertical imbalance but it 
will not eliminate it completely.  Future NFCs would therefore be needed to address the 
issues of reaming vertical and horizontal imbalances. 
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